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INTRODUCTION
The use of victim impact evidence (VIE) has been a standard fea-
ture of capital trials since 1991, when the Supreme Court lifted the
previously existing constitutional bar to such evidence.' Legal schol-
ars have almost universally condemned the use of VIE, criticizing it on
a variety of grounds.2
Yet little empirical analysis exists that examines how VIE influ-
ences the course and outcome of capital trials. Moreover, the handful
of empirical analyses that do exist rely on data gathered in simulation
studies. Although valuable contributions have emerged from these
experimental studies, such studies have often-rehearsed limitations
that stem primarily from a lack of verisimilitude. To begin to comple-
ment the experimental findings with real-case data, we analyze the in-
fluence of VIE based on interviews with over two-hundred jurors who
sat on capital trials in South Carolina between 1985 and 2001.
We pursue three VIE-related topics. First, we describe the VIE
introduced at sentencing trials, using a subset of the interviews that
posed questions directly focusing on VIE. Second, we analyze a factor
closely related to, and influenced by, VIE-a factor we refer to as vic-
tim admirability. We find evidence of a strong correlation between vic-
tim admirability and VIE use. Victim admirability substantially
increases with the increased use and refinement of VIE. In addition,
I See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
2 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Ci-ii. L.
REV. 361 (1996); Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Cen-
tered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 21 (1992); Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender
Heart When the Axe Is Ready to Strike, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 85 (1993); Angela P. Harris, The
Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 Sui. CT. REV. 77; Elizabeth E.job, Narrating Pain: The Prob-
lem with Victim Impact Statements, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17 (2000); Wayne A. Logan,
Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital Trialh, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517
(2000); Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim
Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARiz. L. REV. 143 (1999) [hereinafter Logan, Past]. But
see Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 863 (1996).
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we find some correlation between victim admirability and jurors' per-
ceived seriousness of the crime.
Both increased victim admirability and increased crime serious-
ness might be expected to push jurors toward imposing death
sentences. Our third topic therefore focuses on sentencing outcomes.
We study the relation between capital sentencing outcomes and VIE
itself, as well as the relation between victim admirability-found to be
influenced by VIE-and capital sentencing outcomes. We find no sig-
nificant relation between increased victim admirability and juror capi-
tal sentencing votes, nor do we find a significant relation between the
introduction of VIE and sentencing outcomes.
We proceed as follows: Part I describes the data and changes in
the law governing VIE's introduction in South Carolina. Part II re-
ports how VIE is used in South Carolina. Part III reviews the legal and
empirical literature on VIE and formulates testable hypotheses about
VIE's effects. We formulate these hypotheses based on empirical
claims made in normative critiques of VIE, and on prior experimental
studies. Parts IV and V report our empirical tests of the hypotheses set
forth in Part III.
I
DATA
A. Data Collection
The data analyzed here were gathered as part of the Capital Jury
Project (CJP), a National Science Foundation-funded, multistate re-
search effort.3 Prior to the CJP's efforts, empirical analyses of capital
jury decision making were based primarily on mock jury studies.4
Data gathered from jurors who had actually served on a capital jury
were generally unavailable. 5 The CJP's research is filling the void. 6
- For an overview of the CJP, see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale,
Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995). The CJP began collecting
data nationwide in 1990 with funding from the Law and Social Sciences Program of the
National Science Foundation. Id. at 1043 n.l.
4 See id. at 1071-73.
5 See id. at 1073.
6 For quantitative analyses of CJP data, see Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How
Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No
Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011 (2001) (multistate data);John H. Blume et al., Lessons from
the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA's DEATH PENALTYv (Stephen P. Garvey
ed., forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 144-77, on file with authors) (multistate data); WNil-
liam J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-
Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476 (1998) (multistate
data); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration
of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEx. L. REV. 605 (1999) (multistate data);
Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sony? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Remorse] (South Carolina data);
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death:Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward
308 [Vol. 88:306
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Our analysis uses data gathered from jurors in South Carolina,
the state with by far the largest share of the CJP's total data. Moreo-
ver, published research based on nationwide CJP data suggests that
South Carolina jurors behave much like jurors in other states. 7 With
one exception, our interviews cover cases brought from enactment of
the South Carolina Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of
1986 through the summer of 2001.8 We randomly sampled jurors
who sat in sixty-three cases, with a goal of four juror interviews per
case. 9 The sample includes thirty-three cases resulting in death ver-
dicts and thirty cases resulting in life verdicts. 10 The total number of
the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL SrUD. 277 (2001) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Forecasting]
(South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An
Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Responsibility]
(South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 371 (2001) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Deadly Paradox] (South Carolina
data); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993) (South Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation
and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1998) [here-
inafter Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation] (South Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, The
Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26 (2000) (South Carolina data);
James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Mis-
guided?, 70 INn. L.J. 1161 (1995) (North Carolina data); Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital
Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70
IND. L.J. 1183 (1995) (Kentucky data); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Juy and Absolution: The
Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998)
[hereinafter Sundby, Absolution] (California data); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and
Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (2003) [herein-
after Sundby, Empathy] (California data); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical
Look at How CapitalJuries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1997) (Cali-
fornia data).
For qualitative analyses of CJP data, see Joseph L. Hoffmann, Wlere's The Buck?-Juror
Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995) (Indi-
ana data); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View
from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103 (1995) (Georgia data).
7 See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., Responsibility, supra note 6, at 354 (noting similar pattern
of responses between multistate CJP data and South Carolina CJP data); Garvey, Aggrava-
tion and Mitigation, supra note 6, at 1575-76 (same).
8 The Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986, 1986 S.C. Acts 2955.
The 1986 Act changed the standards of parole in capital cases and provided a natural
starting point for the collection of data. See id. at 2983 (changing parole eligibility for
defendants convicted of capital murder with an aggravating circumstance, but not sen-
tenced to death, from ineligibility for twenty years to ineligibility for thirty years). The one
exception involved a trial conducted in 1985. A later amendment to the South Carolina
death penalty statute provided that capital defendants not sentenced to death would be
ineligible for parole for life. See Act of June 7, 1995, 1995 S.C. Acts 545, 557. Although
courts resentenced a few defendants in the cases sampled as a result of errors in the initial
sentencing trial, the data used here are from the initial trials.
9 One juror was interviewed in five cases, two jurors were interviewed in six cases,
three jurors were interviewed in twelve cases, four jurors were interviewed in thirty-nine
cases, and five jurors were interviewed in one case. Our regression analyses account for the
varying number of interviews per case.
10 Our primary interest when we began collecting data was in the final sentence of the
jury, not the first votes of individual jurors. Consequently, we tried not to include any cases
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jurors interviewed was 214. We made efforts to randomize the jurors
interviewed for each defendant. Post-trial relocation of jurors to un-
known addresses and declinations to be interviewed often limited our
randomization efforts. The results therefore include only those jurors
who were selected'randomly, who were reachable, and who were will-
ing to be interviewed.
The CJP designed and tested the interview instrument, and
trained interviewers administered it. I I Questions covered all phases of
the guilt and sentencing trials. The data include facts about (1) the
crime; (2) racial, economic, and other characteristics of the defen-
dant, the victim, and their families; (3) the process of jury delibera-
tion; and (4) the conduct of the case by defense counsel, the
prosecutor, and the judge. The interviews also included questions
about the demographic characteristics of the jurors, as well as their
views on the death penalty. The result is a data set containing over
750 variables.
Several questions that we asked help analyze VIE. Although the
original survey instrument contained several questions relating to vic-
tims, it contained no questions designed directly to probe the use of
VIE in capital trials. Consequently, beginning in the summer of 2000,
the South Carolina segment of the CJP modified the instrument to
in which jury deliberations ended in deadlock, which under South Carolina law would
result in the autonatic imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2001) ("If the State seeks the death penalty and a
statutory aggravating circumstance is found beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to subsec-
tions (B) and (C), and a recommendation of death is not made, the trial judge must in-
pose a sentence of life imprisonment."). South Carolina judges make considerable effort
to avoid hung juries in capital cases, and studies generally suggest that hung juries are
relatively rare. See, e.g., RiuD HASTie FTl AL., INSIDE TIH E JuRY 27 (1983) ("A survey of trial
judges found that 5.6% of trials resulted in deadlocked juries when unanimous verdicts
were required, and the rate dropped to 3.1% when majority verdicts were allowed."); see
also PAULA L. HANNA]ORD-AGoR IrAL, NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE CouRTs, ARE HUNG JURIES
A PROBLIEM? 41 tbl.4.1 (2002) (reporting that 7.5% (27 of 360) juries in noncapital criminal
cases in four large netropolitan jurisdictiolns-Los Angeles, Maricopa Cotinty, the Bronx,
and the District of Columbia-hung on all counts, 9.6% (36 of 374) juries hung on Count
1, which was typically the most serious count, and 12.8% (46 of 360) juries hung on at least
one count). Our best estimate is that no more than a handful of the juries in outr sample
failed to reach unanimity on either life or death.
The sampling in later years is less comprehensive than in early years. Life sentences
were over-sampled relative to death sentences. The statistical models we construct account
for these different sampling rates. With few exceptions, we interviewed more than one
juror per case. See supra note 9. The models also account for the fact that these juror
responses are not independent of one another. See generally C.J. Skinner, Introduction to
Part A, in ANALYSIS OF COMPLEx SURViE'S 23-58 (C.J. Skinner et al. eds., 1989) (describing
procedures for reducing standard errors that may result from filse assumptions of
independence).
1 1 See Justice Research Ctr., Coll. of Crilinal Justice, Northeastern Univ., Jtror Inter-
view Instrument, National Study of Juror Decision Making in Capital Cases (1997) (unpUb-
lished doctIment, on file with authors).
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include questions designed to assess VIE's operation in that state.'1
The questions asked, for example: (1) how many, if any, of the vic-
tim's family or friends testified during the penalty phase; (2) who testi-
fied; (3) what generally they testified about; (4) how the jurors
reacted emotionally to such testimony; and (5) how important, if at
all, such testimony was in the jurors' sentencing deliberations.' 3
These questions supplement victim-related questions asked prior to
the introduction of the VIE questions. Since adding the VIE-specific
questions, we have conducted twenty-seven additional interviews. Our
analysis relies in part on these recent interviews, but much of it also
uses the complete data set.
We discuss elsewhere the limitations inherent in the data.' 4
These include possible lack of candor by some interviewees, errone-
ous recall, and the fact that interviews are conducted afterjurors have
rendered their verdict.' 5 As a check on our results, and to address
some of the data limitations, we also analyze VIE's impact in South
Carolina using federal data sets on death sentences and murders as
described below. 16 These data sets do not rely on interviews. A limita-
tion worth emphasizing stems from this study's finding that little evi-
dence exists of a relation between the use of VIE and sentencing
outcomes. We explore VIE's influence on outcomes primarily by
looking at case outcomes over time. Our models may understate
VIE's influence on case outcomes insofar as other factors, not ac-
counted for in our models, may have masked VIE's effect.
B. Governing Law
The fall and rise of VIE in the U.S. Supreme Court is a story that
has been often told. We will, therefore, keep our rendition short.
The Court first examined VIE in Booth v. Maryland, decided in June
1987.17 The prosecutor in Booth read a "victim impact statement" to
the jury during the penalty phase of the trial. The information con-
tained in the statement, which had been prepared by the state proba-
tion and parole department based on interviews with the victim's
surviving family members, fell into three general categories: informa-
tion "describ[ing] the personal characteristics of the victims,"',, infor-
12 See Cornell Capital Jury Project, Cornell Law School, Juror Interview Instrument,
Juror Decision Making in Capital Cases (2001) [hereinafter Survey] (unpublished docu-
ment, on file with authors).
3 Id.
14 See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 281-82. We address the possi-
ble influence of the timinlg of the interviews in infra Part V.C.
15 See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 281-82.
16 See infra Part V.
17 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overriled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
18 Id. at 502.
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mation describing the "emotional impact of the crimes on the
family," 19 and information "set[ting] forth the family members' opin-
ions and characterizations of the crimes and the defendant."20 The
Court held that such "information is irrelevant to a capital sentencing
decision and that its admission creates a constitutionally unacceptable
risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. '"21
At least some South Carolina prosecutors construed Booth nar-
rowly, reading it to bar them from introducing testimony about the
victim from the victim's family members, but not from commenting
themselves about the victim in closing arguments. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court rejected this practice. 22 The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed, holding in South Carolina v. Gathers that "[w] hile in this case
it was the prosecutor rather than the victim's survivors who character-
ized the victim's personal qualities, the statement [at issue here] is
indistinguishable in any relevant respect from that in Booth."23
In June 1991, two years after Gathers was decided, the Court re-
versed itself and overruled both Booth and Gathers. The Court held in
Payne v. Tennessee that "a State may properly conclude that for the jury
to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blame-
worthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence
of the specific harm caused by the defendant."24 Each state was there-
fore left to decide for itself whether it would follow Booth and Gathers,
or Payne. The South Carolina Supreme Court gave its answer in Octo-
ber 1991, when it adopted as state law the Payne decision. 25 Of the
214 jurors we interviewed, 103 sat on cases tried after October 1991.
Of course, even before the Court lifted the constitutional ban on
VIE in Payne, capital jurors would often hear basic biographical infor-
mation about the victim during the guilt phase of the trial-victims
never remained completely faceless. After Payne, however, the prose-
cution was free to admit into evidence detailed information about the
victim's life, as well as information about the impact of the victim's
death on others.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 i. at 502-03.
22 State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988), affd, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
23 490 U.S. 805, 811 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
24 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
25 State v. Johnson, 410 S.E.2d 547, 555 (S.C. 1991).
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II
AN OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF VIE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
During Timothy McVeigh's trial, the government called some
thirty-eight victim impact witnesses, a small percentage of those availa-
ble to testify.2 6 The McVeigh trial was (at the time) unique in many
ways, not least of which was the number of victims involved. Yet by all
accounts VIE has been a routine part of most capital trials since the
Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Payne. We asked several questions
designed to give a general overview of how VIE is used in South Caro-
lina capital trials.
VIE is indeed a routine part of capital trials in South Carolina in
the post-Payne era. Of the twenty-seven jurors of whom we asked spe-
cific questions regarding VIE, all but one said that at least one mem-
ber of the victim's family or one friend of the victim presented his or
her views during the penalty phase. However, because a majority of
the jurors in each case indicated that such testimony occurred, the
one juror not reporting such testimony may well have been incorrect.
When we asked more specifically about the relationship between
the VIE witnesses and the victim, the victim's spouse, child, or parent
were the most common witnesses that jurors identified, followed by
siblings and friends, all of whom testified orally. Of the jurors who
reported the use of VIE, ten indicated that the victim's spouse testi-
fied, ten indicated that a parent of the victim testified, ten indicated
that a child of the victim testified, eight indicated that a sibling of the
victim testified, and three indicated that a friend of the victim
testified.
Interviewers asked the jurors about the general content of the
victim impact testimony. Table 1 summarizes the responses. Two
kinds of VIE-testimony about the personal qualities of the victim and
about the impact of the victim's death on the witness-dominated.
However, 12% of the jurors (three of twenty-four) indicated that the
witness or witnesses also testified about what kind of punishment the
witness wanted the defendant to receive. The Court's decision in
Payne is reasonably construed to proscribe such testimony. 27
Three questions probed the importance of the VIE witnesses'
wishes. The first question, included on the questionnaire from the
year 2000 onward, asked how important it was "in determining the
defendant's sentence to follow what you thought were the wishes of
the victim's family and friends?"28 Most jurors (twenty-one of twenty-
four responding) indicated that it was "not important at all" or "not
26 See Logan, Past, supra note 2, at 155.
27 See 501 U.S. at 830 n.2; id. at 835 n.] (Souter, J., concurring).
28 Survey, supra note 12, at 67 (Question X.A.13).
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TABLE 1
WHAT KINDS OF TiiINGS DID THE VIE WITNESSES TALK ABOUT?
(PERCENT RESPONDING)
Yes No n
How the crime affected them financially 4 96 24
How the crime affected them emotionally 92 8 24
How they needed professional help to cope 29 71 24
W'hat kind of person the victim was 92 8 24
What the victim's future aspirations and plans were 67 33 24
How much they miss the victim 96 4 24
What punishment they wanted to see the defendant receive 12 88 24
Source -Juror interviews in South Carolina capital cases, 1996-2001.
very important" to follow what they believed were the wishes of the
victim's friends and family in determining the defendant's sentence.
Three jurors indicated the wishes were "somewhat important" and
one indicated that they were "most important."
Before and after 2000, we asked all jurors about the extent to
which juror discussions focused on thirty-eight topics of possible rele-
vance to the sentencing decision.29 Table 2 shows, on a 1 to 4 scale,
the jurors' responses with respect to victim-related topics. The first
numerical column shows the mean response for cases tried in 1988,
1989, 1990, and 1991. These years form the period when Booth's pro-
hibition on VIE should have led to its reduced use. The second nu-
merical column shows the mean response for post-1991 cases, tried
after Payne authorized the use of VIE, and when greater use of VIE
might have caused jurors' focus to be more victim oriented. The
number of respondents is 182.
The third numerical column, labeled "Significance," shows the
significance level, often also referred to as the p-value, of a test of the
hypothesis that the responses before and after 1991 are from the same
distribution. For example, the "Reputation or character of the victim"
row indicates a significance level of 0.230. This means that approxi-
mately 23 chances in 100 exist of observing by chance a difference
between the pre- and post-1991 responses as strong or stronger than
the observed correlation. At conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance (p = 0.05), we cannot reject the hypothesis that no difference in
the pattern of responses to this question exists between the two
periods.1
29 h(. at 3) (Question III.D.2).
30) One can view Table 2 as exploring the hypothesis that the pre- and post-1991 sam-
ples of responses are from the same distribution. By convention, the hypothesis being
tested is called the null hypothesis. GiORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRA\N, STATIS-
TicAt MTiions 64 (8th ed. 1989). The reported significance levels are the probability of
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. That is, the significance levels provide an
[Vol. 88:306
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TABLE 2
Focus OF JUROR DISCUSSIONS RELIATING TO THE VICTIM
IN CAPITAL CASES
How much did the discussion among the jurors focus on the following topics?
(I = great deal 2 = fair amount 3 = not much 4 = not at all)
Mean Mean
1988-1991 post-1991 Significance
Discussion items relating to the victim (n = 86) (n = 96) (p-value)
Reputation or character of the victim 2.52 2.34 0.230
Loss or grief of victim's family 2.14 1.94 0.088
Punishment wanted by victim's family 3.08 2.94 0.448
Victim's role or responsibility in the crime 2.69 2.81 0.463
Innocence or helplessness of the victim 1.81 1.70 0.307
Pain or siffering of the victim before death 1.91 1.69 0.048
Way in which the victim was killed 1.47 1.32 0.116
Source -juror interviews in South Carolina capital cases, 1988-2001.
Table 2's pattern of responses supports exploring possible VIE
effects on capital case processing. The direction of the change in ju-
rors' responses is the same for six of the seven victim-related ques-
tions: the post-1991 mean is lower than the earlier period's mean.
That downward shift in means indicates a shift toward increased dis-
cussion of victim admirability, victim-family loss, and increased victim
suffering. Moreover, the change in responses to two of Table 2's ques-
tions, standing alone, are unlikely to have happened by chance. Both
the discussion of the loss or grief of the victim's family and the discus-
sion of the victim's pain or suffering noticeably increased after 1991.
The first increase is marginally statistically significant, with p < 0.1, and
the second is statistically significant, with p < 0.05.
The only topic that was discussed less on average by jurors in the
post-1991 period than in the earlier period is the "victim's role or re-
sponsibility in the crime." Yet this change is consistent with the pat-
tern of change for the six other questions. The fact that jurors
discussed the victim's role or responsibility in the crime less in the
post-1991 period corresponds to an improved image of the victim.
Table 2 also shows that, of the seven victim-related topics, juror
discussion focused least on the punishment wanted by the victims'
families. This is true for both time periods, before and after 1991.
inverse measure of the likelihood that the difference in responses between the two periods
shows a real difference rather than mere random variation. The smaller the significance
level, the more unlikely it would be to observe the difference if the tested hypothesis were
true. See id. By arbitrary convention, results that are significant at or below the 0.05 level
are described as statistically significant. See, e.g., Tiir Evoi.WNG Roi.r oF SrATisricAL AssEss-
MENrS AS EVIDENCE IN TilE COURTS 197 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989). The significance
levels in Table 2 are based on the Mann-Whitney test. See SNEDECOR & COchRAN, supra, at
142-44.
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Moreover, the difference between the focus of discussion on what the
victim's family wanted before and after 1991 is not statistically signifi-
cant. Jurors also tended to discuss the victim's suffering, reputation,
or other topics to a substantially greater degree than the punishment
wanted by the victim's family in both time periods. The difference
between reported discussion of the punishment wanted by the family
and the next-most-discussed topic is highly statistically significant in
each period (p < 0.0001). 3 1
Jurors' de-emphasis of victims' families' wishes emerges again in
response to a question about how important several considerations
were in deciding punishment.3 2 Using the same 1 to 4 scale and cases
as in Table 2, the punishment the family wanted received a mean re-
sponse of 3.10, with a slight but statistically insignificant decrease in
importance after 1991. The importance of the victim's pain and suf-
fering received a mean response of 1.62, with slightly more impor-
tance after 1991, but that difference is not statistically significant.
Jurors said that the families' punishment wishes were among the least
important factors considered in sentencing.
This summary of juror responses to questions about VIE and dis-
cussion patterns is suggestive of what the analyses reported below re-
veal. The jurors' reported content of VIE evidence and their
discussions suggest that VIE led to increased empathy for victims and
their families. Nevertheless, VIE evidence does not appear to have
been directed to, or to have had a direct and material effect on, sen-
tencing outcomes. To the extent that VIE humanizes the victim and
enhances juror information about victim status, VIE could well reso-
nate with factors that influence sentencing decisions. We therefore
turn from analyzing what jurors report about the content of VIE, and
their discussion of victim-related topics, to more substantive issues re-
lated to VIE's effect on sentencing outcomes.
III
HYPOTHESES
We begin by reviewing some of the empirical hypotheses formu-
lated in the legal and empirical literature dealing with VIE's use in
capital cases. The hypotheses address VIE's effect both directly on the
ultimate question of sentencing outcome, and on jurors' perceptions
about victims' admirability, which might indirectly influence sentenc-
ing decisions.
'I1 These significance levels are based on the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks
test. See SNFDECOR & COCHRAN, supra note 30, at 141.
342 See Survey, supra note 12, at 34 (Qnestion IV.l).
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A. From the Empirical Literature
Four published studies explore the effect of information about
victim characteristics on variables relevant to capital sentencing. Each
of these studies is, however, a mock study. None involved real jurors
who sat on real cases.
The earliest study, published in 1995 by James Luginbuhl and
Michael Burkhead, used ninety-nine non-death-qualified undergradu-
ate students at North Carolina State University, each of whom re-
viewed descriptions of two crimes.33 One depicted a "[m]oderately
[a]ggravated murder" in which the jury convicted the defendant of
murder for shooting an innocent bystander during the course of a
robbery.34 The facts left unclear whether the killing was intentional.
The other depicted a "[s]everely [aiggravated murder" in which the
jury convicted the defendant of murder based on the multiple stab-
bing of an elderly man, whom the defendant had tied to a chair dur-
ing the course of a robbery.35
The subjects were told that the defendant in each case was ar-
rested, tried, and convicted of first degree murder.36 Half of the sub-
jects in each group then read a victim impact statement modeled after
the statement admitted in Booth. The same statement was used for
both crimes and described "the reactions of the victim's children and
grandchildren to the victim's death, their description of the qualities
of the victim, as well as some of their opinions about a person who
would commit such a murder."37
Luginbuhl's major hypothesis was that "the introduction of victim
impact evidence would increase the number of subjects who voted for
[the death penalty] ."38 His results supported that hypothesis. Over-
all, fifty-one percent of the students exposed to the victim impact
statement voted for death, while only twenty percent of those not ex-
posed voted for death. 39 The effect obtained for both the moderately
and severely aggravated scenarios.40
The other two studies, one conducted by Edith Greene and the
other conducted by Greene and her colleagues, were published in
•33 SeeJames Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial:
Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 6-7 (1995). "Death qualification is the
process by which courts identify and exclude from capital juries those people whose views
on the death penalty are . . .incompatible with the duties of capital jurors." Samuel R.
Gross, Determining the Neutrality of Death-Qualified Juries: Judicial Appraisal of Empirical Data, 8
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 7, 7 (1984).
34 Luginbuhl & Burkhead, supra note 33, at 7.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 9.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 12 tbl.4.
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1999 and 1998, respectively.4' Unlike the Luginbuhl study, neither of
the Greene studies examined VIE's effect on sentencing outcome, fo-
cusing instead on VIE's relation to a variety of intermediate variables.
The 1998 study used eighty non-death-qualified participants who
were recruited for the study through an advertisement placed in a lo-
cal newspaper. 49 Subjects learned that the defendant had been con-
victed of first-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. They were
then shown one of two one-hour videotapes of the penalty phase pro-
ceeding, complete with opening and closing arguments and presenta-
tion of evidence by the prosecution and defense. 43 One videotape
depicted the victims as a respectable elderly couple; the other de-
picted them as less respectable.4 4 As in Booth, the VIE consisted of the
testimony of a social worker who had prepared the statement. 45 Par-
ticipants were then asked to complete a questionnaire that probed a
variety of issues.
The study found thatjurors who "heard VIE about highly respect-
able . . . victims ... rated these victims as more likable, decent, and
valuable; felt more compassion for the victims' family; believed that
the emotional impact of the murders on survivors was greater; and
rated the crime as more serious. ' '4" Although subjects in the high-
respectability condition tended to attach less weight to the mitigating
evidence presented than did subjects in the low-respectability condi-
tion, they attached no greater weight to aggravating evidence.4 7
The 1999 study involved 182 participants "enrolled in psychology
courses at an urban university," ranging in age from 19 to 58.48 The
study examined the effect not only of the personal characteristics of
the victim, comparing high- and low-respectability, but also of the
other two forms of VIE: evidence related to the impact of the crime
on the victim's family and testimony involving survivors' opinions
about the crime and the appropriate sentence. 4 9 Greene categorized
these three forms of VIE: (1) "victim qualities" evidence, (2) "impact"
evidence, and (3) "opinion[ ]" evidence. 511
41 Edith Greene, The Many Guises of Victim mpact Evidence and Effects on Jurors'Judg-
ments, 5 PSYCHOL., CRIMF & L. 331 (1999); Edith Greene et al., Victim Impact Evidence in
Capital Cases: Does the Victims Character Matter?, 28 J. Amwl, iO Soc. PsychloL. 145 (1998).
42 See Greene et al., supra note 41, at 149.
4 Id. at 150-51.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 151.
46 Id. at 154.
47 See id.
48 Greene, supra note 41, at 337.
49 See id. The study also asked the subjects whether they believed they should hear
various forms of VIE. Id. at 339.
50 Id.
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In general, mock jurors who received all three forms of VIE had a
more favorable view of the victim and the victim's survivors than did
those who received only impact or opinion evidence, or no victim-
related evidence at all. 51 Moreover, the reactions of the mock jurors
to the defendant were, consistent with the previous study, uniform
across the various conditions. 5 2 Finally, and again consistent with the
previous study, the subjects in the high-respectability condition
tended to think more highly of the victim and to rate more highly the
suffering of the victim's survivors than did subjects in the low-respecta-
bility condition. 53
The final study, by Bryan Myers and Jack Arbuthnot, involved 416
undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology
course at Ohio University. The students were divided into four
groups. 54 One group watched a videotaped version of a capital trial in
which the court admitted VIE at the penalty phase, and in which the
evidence of guilt was strong. A second group watched the videotape
of the trial, with the same strong evidence of guilt, but without the
VIE. 55 A third group watched a version of the trial in which the court
admitted VIE, but in which the evidence of guilt was weak.56 And a
fourth group watched the version of the trial with weak evidence of
guilt, but without VIE. 5 7 Jurors were grouped in forty-eight juries and
asked to give their verdict on guilt and on sentence both before and
after deliberating as a jury.58
The authors concluded that "victim impact evidence . . . in-
creased the likelihood that individual jurors would recommend the
death penalty."59 However, the authors noted that although 'jurors
who were exposed to the victim impact evidence tended to apply har-
sher sentences than jurors not exposed to the victim impact evidence,
[that effect appeared] only after deliberating with other jurors. ' 61
The effect did not appear in the jurors' pre-deliberation responses.
The authors speculated that deliberations may have increased jurors'
confidence in the correctness of their verdict on guilt, and that "[a]s
jurors become more confident in their verdicts following deliberation,
51 See id. at 340-41.
52 See id. at 342.
53 See id.
54 Bryan Myers &Jack Arbuthnot, The Effects of Victim Impact Evidence on the Verdicts and
SentencingJudgments of Mock Jurors, 29 J. OFFENDER REIIABILI TAriON 95, 99-100 (1999).
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 99, 102-03.
59 Id. at 108.
60 Id.
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those who felt the defendant deserved the death penalty may have
been more willing to express it. ' '61
B. From the Legal Literature
The legal literature on VIE in capital cases is almost uniformly
critical.62 Some critics focus on the judicial process, arguing that the
Court's overruling of Booth and Gathers reflected nothing more princi-
pled than a change in the Court's personnel. 63 Other critics argue
that capital jurors should not be exposed to VIE because such evi-
dence is irrelevant to the decision they are asked to make."4 Whatever
effects it may have on juror decision making, VIE simply has no legiti-
mate role to play in a capital trial.
Other critics, however, assume that VIE does influence jury be-
havior. Their arguments therefore depend on VIE's assumed ef-
fects. 65 These effects overlap with those explored in the experimental
literature. We focus here on three such effects. 66
61 Id.
62 See sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., David R. Dow, Mhen Law Bows to Politics: Explaining Payne v. Tennessee, 26
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 157, 157 (1992).
64 See, e.g., Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of
Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 118 (1997).
65 Our data allow us to explore some of these effects, but not others. For example,
some critics argue that VIE should not be admitted in capital trials because doing so will
cause the proceeding to degenerate into an unseemly mini-trial on the life and worth of
the victim. See, e.g., Beth E. Sullivan, Note, Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of
Victim Impact Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings from Passion and Prejudice, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 601, 628-30 (1998). We have no simple way to test this hypothesis.
66 Some critics build on prior research showing that the capital sentencing system
tends to impose death sentences more often when the victim is white and less often when
the victim is black. VIE can only be expected to increase the strength of this already-
existing effect insofar as it increases the salience of the victim and the victim's identity.
Prior research conducted in South Carolina suggests that defendant and victim racial ef-
fects may help explain prosecutorial decisions to charge a defendant with a capital crime.
SeeJohn H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1782, 1790, 1794 n.1 16 (1998) (collecting evidence of race-based
"death-seeking" decision making on the part of solicitors in several South Carolina coun-
ties); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death
Penalty in South Carolina, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOc 754, 764-65, 784 (1983) (conclud-
ing based on analysis of 321 capital murders in South Carolina between 1977 and 1981 that
the "prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty is significantly related to the race of
the victim"); Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death
Penalty in South Carolina: Experiences over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REV. 245, 278-79, 405
(1988) (concluding based on well-controlled analysis of 302 death-eligible felony
murders-which constituted 97% of all death-eligible murders in South Carolina between
1977 and 1981-that "South Carolina prosecutors operated with a race-specific definition
of homicide severity and were more tolerant of black-victim than white-victim killings").
But prior South Carolina research suggests that these racial effects do not persist at trial.
Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 300-01 tbl.6.
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1. VIE Causes Differential Valuation of Victims
First, some critics argue that VIE should be prohibited because
admitting such evidence will prompt jurors to place greater value on
the lives of some victims and less on the lives of others. 67 On this view,
VIE will cause jurors to place more value on the lives of "respectable"
victims and less on the lives of others. 6 This critique resonates with
Greene's empirical evidence that VIE may enhance the extent to
which jurors admire or respect the victim. 69
2. VIE Increases the Capriciousness of Capital Sentencing
Second, some critics argue that this differential valuation of vic-
tims increases the capriciousness of capital sentencing. According to
this view, the impression a juror forms about the value or respectabil-
ity of the victim depends on a variety of factors, none of which is ra-
tionally related to the goals of capital sentencing. Moreover, jurors
will rely on their valuation of the victim when they decide the defen-
dant's sentence.70 This critique resonates with Luginbuhl's findings
that VIE increases death sentences.71
3. VIE Will Increase Estimates of the Seriousness of the Crime and
Reduce the Influence of Mitigating Evidence
Third, some critics argue that VIE will focus the jury's attention
on the victim, and that jurors who focus on the victim will not focus
on the defendant.72 Consequently, VIE will cause jurors to pay more
attention to the harm the victim suffered and to assign that harm
greater weight in their sentencing calculus. Conversely, VIE will cause
jurors to pay less attention to any mitigating evidence that the defen-
dant presents and to assign that evidence less weight in their sentenc-
ing calculus.73 The concern about increased focus on harm to victims
resonates with Greene's findings that VIE can increase estimates of
crime seriousness.7 4 Likewise, the concern about VIE's effects on miti-
gating evidence resonates with Greene's finding that greater victim
admirability can lead decision makers to attach less weight to mitigat-
ing evidence.7 5
67 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 64, at 118.
68 See id. at 106-07.
69 See Greene et al., supra note 41, at 154.
70 See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 2, at 86-87; Logan, Past, supra note 2, at 157-58.
71 Luginbuhl & Burkhead, supra note 33, at 9.
72 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 2, at 366, 395; Matthew L. Engle, Due Process Limitations
on Victim Impact Evidence, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 78 (2000).
73 See Engle, supra note 72, at 80-81.
74 Greene et al., supra note 41, at 154.
75 See id.
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IV
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: VICTIM ADMIRABILITY AND ITS
INFLUENCE ON CRIME SERIOUSNESS, AGGRAVATING
FACTORS, AND MITIGATING FACTORS
The empirical and legal literature thus generate the following hy-
potheses: (1) VIE increases victim admirability or respectability; (2)
VIE increases perceptions of crime seriousness; (3) VIE reduces the
effect of mitigating evidence; and (4) VIE increases the likelihood of a
death sentence. This Part explores the first three issues. Part V ex-
plores the relation between VIE and sentencing outcomes.
A. What Influences the Degree of Admiration for Victims?
The idea that VIE improves jurors' views of victims, with possible
consequences on sentencing outcomes, is a common theme of the
experimental and legal literature on VIE. Because VIE is nearly uni-
versally used in post-1991 cases, one cannot explore whether VIE im-
proves victim admirability by comparing cases with and without VIE
evidence in the same time period. However, before 1991, VIE was
legally forbidden. Moreover, after 1991, prosecutors may have be-
come more skilled in their use of VIE. Both of these considerations
suggest the possibility of a time effect of VIE. That is, victim admira-
bility should have increased once the Court allowed VIE, and as prose-
cutors refined their use of it over time.
To explore the relation between time and jurors' perceptions of
victims, we need a measure of victim admirability or respectability.
The juror interviews included two questions that directly addressed
the victim's status. We use the answers to these questions as a proxy
for victim admirability. One question focused on jurors' perception
of the victim's status in the community: "In your mind, how well do
the following words describe the victim? '76 The words were "admired
or respected in the community." The available responses were "very
well," "fairly well," "not well," and "not at all," 77 and used a 1 to 4 scale,
with 1 corresponding to "not at all" and 4 corresponding to "very
well."' 78 The second question focused more on each juror's own reac-
tion to the victim rather than the juror's perception of the commu-
nity's attitude, asking whether the juror "admired or respected" the
victim and calling for a "yes" or "no" response.79
The jurors generally thought well of the victims. The mean re-
sponse to the community-admiration question, 3.38 with 199 respon-
76 Survey, supra note 12, at 13 (Question II.C.1).
77 Id.
78 Id. For convenience, this reverses the interview instrument's actual numerical
coding.
79 Id. (Question II.C.3).
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dents, is between the two highest admiration rankings, and about 86%
of the jurors responded with the two highest community admiration
scores, 3 and 4. In response to the "yes-no" question about the juror's
own admiration or respect for the victim, 59% of the 195 responding
jurors gave a positive response.
As suggested above, one question is whether the level of victim
admiration changed over time. Figure 1 explores the relation be-
tween the year of trial and juror reports of victim admirability by the
community. For each year, we compute the mean of juror responses
to the community-admiration question. We also compute the number
of juror interviews contributing to each year's admirability mean. Fig-
ure 1 uses that annual count of interviews to identify the year's mean.
For example, for 1989, the data point indicated by the number
"20" represents the fact that 20 juror interviews comprised that year's
annual mean victim admiration rating. Those 20 interviews had a
mean response on the 1 to 4 scale of victim admirability of a little over
3.5. In 1999, the figure indicates that 10 interviews contributed to the
mean of 4 reported in the figure. Reporting the number of interviews
comprising the mean suggests the relative weight that might be given
to a particular year's observations. For example, the years 1985 and
1994 seem to depart most from the overall trend of the data, but both
those years contain relatively few observations, 4 and 5 interviews
respectively.
The pattern over time is mixed until 1991, after which a generally
increasing time trend in victim admirability appears. This result is
consistent with VIE's uncertain status through 1991, and then its con-
stitutional endorsement that year. The figure suggests that, over time,
either defendants are murdering a more admirable group of victims,
or prosecutors, assisted first by permission to use VIE and later by in-
creasing experience in using VIE, have been able to convince jurors of
greater victim admirability. The pattern is similar if one plots the an-
nual mean of the juror-admired victim question over time.
Figure l's suggestion of a time trend in victim admirability can be
tested further by controlling for other factors about the victim. Al-
though we lack detailed information about the victim, such as employ-
ment or income status, we do have information about objective victim
characteristics that might influence victim admirability. These charac-
teristics include the victim's age, sex, and race. The same information
is also available about jurors. Table 3 summarizes the variables re-
ported in Table 4's regression models of victim admirability. Two of
the jurors' personal characteristic variables-age and race-are insuf-
ficiently helpful in explaining victim admirability to warrant inclusion
in Table 4's regression models.
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FIGURE 1
VICTIM ADMIRABILITY OVER TIME-SOUTH CAROLINA CAPITAL TRIALS
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Table 4 combines the most salient variables in Table 3 into re-
gression models of victim admirability.8 1s Models (1) to (3) are of the
community-admiration variable, with its scale of 1 to 4. Models (4) to
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED TO MODEL.
VICTIM ADMIRABILITY
Variable n Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum
Year of trial 214 1992 3.90 1985 2001
Victim age (years) 211 35.72 17.50 2 86
Victim sex (female = 1) 213 0.48 0.50 0 1
Victim race (black = 1) 212 0.12 0.32 0 1
Juror age (years) 212 44.38 11.69 22 75
Juror sex (female - 1) 213 0.54 0.50 0 1
Juror race (black = 1) 212 0.17 0.37 0 1
Source -Juror interviews in South Carolina capital cases, 1985-2001.
(6) are of the dichotomous juror-admired victim variable. The most
consistent result across the models is the statistical significance of the
"Year of trial" variable. Victim admirability, at least in our sample, is
increasing over time, a result consistent with jurors' discussion pat-
8o We used ordered probit regression models for the community-admiration question
because that variable is ordinal and takes on more than two values. See generally ALAN
AGRES'n, CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS 102-04 (1990). We used probit models for the di-
chotomous juror admiration variable.
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terns reported in Part II. As explained above, we cannot claim direct
proof of the effect of VIE on victim admirability, but the trend is fully
consistent with growing and improving use of VIE by prosecutors.
Other results in Table 4 worth noting are the correlation between vic-
tim age and admirability for the community-admiration models and
the significance of female jurors in model (6).
TABLE 4
ORDERED PROBIT AND PROBIT MODELS OF VICTIM ADMIRABILITY
Model Model Model Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable = Dependent variable =
Community admired victim Juror admired victim
Year of trial 0.072** 0.071* 0.073* 0.081** 0.084** 0.092**
(2.69) (2.15) (2.22) (2.75) (2.67) (2.98)
Victim age 0.018** 0.018** 0.009 0.008
(2.74) (2.79) (1.48) (1.31)
Victim sex
(female = 1) -0.182 -0.174 -0.104 -0.136
(0.81) (0.79) (0.42) (0.55)
Victim race
(black = 1) -0.234 -0.246 -0.256 -0.314
(0.80) (0.82) (0.54) (0.67)
juror sex
(female - 1) 0.097 0.466*
(0.48) (2.13)
Constant -161.381** -167.152** -182.562**
(2.74) (2.67) (2.98)
Observations 199 195 194 195 190 189
Probability > F 0.0091 0.0062 0.0104 0.0079 0.0684 0.0086
Absolute value of robust I statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source -Juror interviews in South Carolina capital cases, 1985-2001.
Note - Models account for clustering at the case level.
One could argue that Table 4's models should include other vari-
ables. Accordingly, we have tested models that include combinations
of victim and juror variables, including race and sex combinations, the
seriousness of the crime, and the outcome of the sentencing proceed-
ing (that is, whether a death sentence was imposed). The time trend
survives in these models. We have also limited the sample to post-
1991 years, and the time trend again persists. The time trend is, how-
ever, more sensitive to the inclusion of recent years. Although the
coefficient on the "Year of trial" variable is consistently positive, corre-
sponding to increasing victim admirability, it becomes statistically in-
significant if one excludes the years after 1998. Given the relatively
few capital cases in a given year, and the subset of cases chosen for
juror interviews, the sensitivity of results to inclusion of recent years is
an important cautionary note.
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B. Victim Admirability and the Seriousness of the Crime
The preceding section is consistent with the claim that VIE en-
hances the victim's status in the eyes of the jury. Moreover, the vic-
tim's status can be a cause as well as an effect of certain case features.
One such victim-status effect in Greene's studies can be directly tested
with our data. Greene and her coauthors report a relation between
the respectability of the victim and the subjects' rating of the serious-
ness of the crime.81 Jurors perceived crimes as more serious when
they thought the victims were more respectable. Ourjuror interviews
contained questions that serve as useful proxies for both the serious-
ness of the crime and the respectability of crime victims. We use the
victim admirability variables discussed above as proxies for victim
respectability.
We report elsewhere a summary of the interview variables relating
to the seriousness of the crime and briefly summarize that discussion
here.8 2 All murders are serious crimes, and capital murders are aggra-
vated murders. Some capital murders, however, are worse than
others, and a juror will more likely vote for death if she believes the
crime is among the worst of the worst. To learn how each juror as-
sessed the seriousness of the crime, we asked how well a particular
word or phrase-for example, "vicious" or "bloody"-described the
killing.83 We provided the interviewed jurors with twelve words or
phrases to describe the killing. As we reported elsewhere, several of
the words or phrases used to describe the killing-"gory," "vicious,"
"depraved," "calculated," "cold-blooded," and "victim made to suf-
fer"-bear a statistically significant association with whether jurors
voted to sentence to death. 84 But only two words or phrases-"vi-
cious" and "victim made to suffer"-retained their significance in
models that controlled for other key variables, such as the juror's race,
the juror's support for the death penalty, and the defendant's re-
morse. Accordingly, we previously used jurors' responses to how "vi-
cious" the crime was as a proxy for the seriousness of the defendant's
crime, ' 5 and do so here as well.
1. Community Admiration and Crime Seriousness
Table 5 summarizes the responses to the viciousness (reported in
the table as "Crime Seriousness") and community admiration ques-
tions. The table's "Total" column suggests that jurors generally be-
lieved that the community admired the victims. As reported above,
81 Greene et al., supra note 41, at 154.
82 See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 287-89.
83 Survey, supra note 12, at 5 (Question II.A.2).
84 Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, sulpa note 6, at 287-89.
85 Id. at 289.
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the mean response to the community-admiration question, 3.38, is be-
tween the two highest admiration rankings.8 6 Table 5 also shows that
mostjurors thought "vicious" described the killing "very well," giving it
the highest possible score of 4 (corresponding to "most serious" in the
table). The mean viciousness ranking is 3.70 on the 1 to 4 scale with
about 80% of jurors assigning the highest viciousness ranking.
TABLE 5
RELATION BETWEEN VICTIM ADMIRABILITY AND CRIME SERIOUSNESS
Community
admired victim Crime seriousness
1 2 3 4 Total
least most
serious serious
1 0 0 0 7 7
least admired 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.5%
2 0 1 5 15 21
0.0% 4.8% 23.8% 71.4% 10.6%
3 3 1 13 44 61
4.9% 1.6% 21.3% 72.1% 30.8%
4 2 2 13 92 109
most admired 1.8% 1.8% 11.9% 84.4% 55.1%
Total 5 4 31 158 198
2.5% 2.0% 15.7% 79.8% 100%
Source -Juror interviews in South Carolina capital cases, 1985-2001.
The results in Table 5 also suggest that viciousness and victim ad-
miration move together. For the most admired victims, over 84% of
the jurors ranked the crime most serious. For the next-most admired
victims, 72% ranked the crime most serious. For the third-ranked
score of victim admiration, equal to 2, 71% of the jurors ranked the
crime as most serious. Among the seven jurors who ranked the victim
as least admired, however, all ranked the crime as most serious. In
general, the direction of the relationship is as Greene's research sug-
gests: more-admired victims are viewed as the victims of more-serious
crimes. The relationship between community admiration and crime
seriousness is not, however, statistically significant (p = 0.156).87
The pattern of responses in Table 5 raises the question whether,
for purposes of comparison with Greene's experimental results, the
86 See supra Part IVA.
87 Because the viciousness and community admiration variables are both ordered cat-
egorical variables, Kendall's tau is used to test the significance of their relation. See generally
Alan Agresti, The Effect of Category Choice on Some Ordinal Measures of Association, 71 J. Am.
STAT. Ass'N 49, 54 (1976). For more on ordinal measures of association, see ALAN AGR.STI,
ANALYSIS OF ORDINAL CATEGORICAL DATA 75-76 (1984).
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least-admired-victim category (Table 5's first row) causes the signifi-
cance of the relation to be understated. All seven of the jurors who
believed the community would least admire the victim ranked the
crime as most serious. Given the small fraction of least-admired victim
responses, 3.5%, it is reasonable to test the relation between victim
admiration and crime seriousness for those victims not regarded as
being the least admirable. Indeed, excluding those seven responses
does yield a statistically significant relationship between victim admira-
bility and crime seriousness (p = 0.045). Although Greene varied the
victims' respectability across two scenarios, neither of her scenarios
warranted ranking the victim's admirability at the lowest value on a
four-point scale. 88 If one indulges in separate treatment of the least-
admired victims, the significance of the relation between crime vi-
ciousness and victim admirability is reasonably robust, even surviving
regression analysis that includes as an explanatory variable whether a
death sentence was finally imposed. 9
2. Juror Admiration and Crime Seriousness
The relation between crime seriousness and victim admirability
weakens if one shifts from the juror's estimation of the community's
admiration of the victim to the juror's own assessment. The direction
of the relation is as expected. Jurors who admired the victim assigned
the crime a mean viciousness rank of 3.73, while jurors who did not
admire the victim assigned the crime a mean viciousness rank of 3.66.
But the relation is not statistically significant, and it remains insignifi-
cant after controlling for other factors, including sentencing
outcome.
In sum, the real-case data generally support Greene's finding that
victim respectability influences the level of crime seriousness. The re-
lation is, however, noticeably more significant for jurors' perceptions
of community admiration of the victim than it is for their own assess-
ments of the victim's admirability.
C. Victim Admirability and Mitigating and Aggravating
Circumstances
Greene and her coauthors found that mock jurors judging cases
with more-respectable victims tended to attach less weight to some
mitigating evidence than did mock jurors judging cases with less-re-
spectable victims.90 In contrast, they found no evidence that mock
88 See Greene, supra note 41, at 338.
89 The relation also remains statistically significant if one uses the juror's first vote as
an explanatory variable.
90 See Greene et al., supra note 41, at 153-54.
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jurors differentially weighed aggravating evidence. 91 To explore the
effect of victim status on juror receptivity to mitigating evidence, we
used a series of interview questions in which jurors were asked about
mitigating factors that, according to the jurors' self-reports, influ-
enced their vote on the defendant's sentence, or might have influ-
enced their vote if the factor in question had been present, though in
fact was not.
Table 6 lists a set of possibly mitigating factors extracted from the
interview. 92 If a juror reported that the presence of the mitigating
factor did or would have made the juror more likely to vote for death,
we coded the response as "1." If the juror reported that the presence
of the mitigating factor did or would have made the juror 'just as
likely to vote for death," we coded the response as "2." If the juror
reported that the factor did or would have made the juror less likely to
vote for death, we coded the response as "3."93
Table 6's first numerical column, labeled "Mean," reports the ju-
rors' mean responses. A mean of less than 2 indicates that, on aver-
age, the factor's presence would make a vote for death more likely. A
mean of more than 2 indicates that, on average, the factor's presence
would make a vote for life more likely. The pattern of means indi-
cates that almost all the factors reported here would have some miti-
gating effect. For example, the mean of 2.54 for "Defendant had a
history of mental illness" suggests that this factor strongly influences
jurors to vote for life.
The question here, however, is not the absolute level of the miti-
gating factors' influences. Rather, it is the relation between victim ad-
mirability and the jurors' reports of a particular mitigating factor's
effect. If VIE's primary effect is on victim admirability, it is natural to
ask if admirability affects jurors' reactions to mitigating evidence.
One can ask if each mitigating factor's importance increases or de-
creases with increased victim admirability, and whether that increase
or decrease is statistically significant.
Table 6's third numerical column reports tests of the statistical
significance of the relation between victim admirability and jurors'
coded responses to each mitigating factor.94 None of the tests yields a
statistically significant result. Consequently, we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that victim admirability has no significant association with ju-
rors' reactions to mitigating evidence. Nor can we confirm Greene
91 See id. at 153.
92 Survey, supra note 12, at 42 (Question W.B.1).
93 See id.
94 Because the viciousness and community admiration variables are both ordered cat-
egorical variables, Kendall's tau is used to test the significance of their relation. See supra
note 87 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 6
RELATION BETWEEN VICTIM ADMIRABILITY AND
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Significance of relation
between admirability and
Mean mitigating circumstance
Potential mitigating factor (1-3) n (p-value)
The killing was not premeditated but was
committed during another crime, such
as a robbery, when the victim tried to
resist 1.98 150 0.922
The killing was committed while
defendant was under the influence of
an extreme mental or emotional
disturbance 2.48 166 0.810
The victim was a known troublemaker 2.10 173 0.295
The victim had a criminal record 2.04 174 0.531
The victim was an alcoholic 2.03 172 0.255
The victim was a drug addict 2.04 171 0.486
Defendant had no previous criminal
record 2.12 150 0.676
Defendant was mentally retarded 2.72 171 0.851
Defendant had a loving family 2.16 152 0.343
Defendant was tinder 18 when the crime
occurred 2.36 173 0.756
Defendant had a history of mental illness 2.54 169 0.343
Defendant had a background of extreme
poverty 2.15 162 0.223
Defendant had been seriously abused as a
child 2.35 168 0.499
Defendant had been in institutions in the
past but was never given any real help
or treatment for his problems 2.43 153 0.366
Source -Juror interviews in South Carolina capital cases, 1985-2001.
Note - The table reports the relation between juror reports of victim admirability and
whether the presence of listed items of possibly mitigating evidence would make the juror
more likely to vote for death. Mitigating factors range from I to 3, with I indicating most
likely to vote for death and 3 indicating least likely.
and her coauthors' experimental finding thatjurors in cases involving
more-respectable victims tended to assign less weight to some mitigat-
ing evidence. However, like Greene and her coauthors, we find, in
results not reported here, no correlation between victim admirability
and the weight accorded to aggravating evidence.
V
EMPIRICAl. RESULTS: VIE's EFFECT ON CASE OUTCOMES
A central concern about VIE is that it can unjustly affect the sen-
tencing outcome by influencing jurors who might otherwise vote for
life to vote instead for death. The hypothesis is that VIE enhances
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victim status, or the perceived seriousness of defendant conduct,
which in turn increases the likelihood that ajuror will vote for death.
Luginbuhl's experimental findings and the speculation of legal theo-
rists both suggest that VIE influences sentencing outcomes. This Part
explores the relation between victim status and juror votes as an indi-
rect test of VIE's impact. If enhanced victim status does not increase
the likelihood of a vote for death, VIE's effect on victim status might
not translate into higher death sentence rates.
As discussed above, no constitutional ban on VIE existed at the
national level before 1987. In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Booth
that introducing VIE was unconstitutional 5 In 1991, the Court in
Payne reversed Booth and allowed each state to decide whether to allow
VIE. 9 6 Most, if not all, states, including South Carolina, decided to
allow VIE. -97 Consequently, VIE could generally have been used
before 1987, used less or not at all between 1987 and 1991, and then
used again after 1991.
Our previous work with the South Carolina CJP data and these
national VIE developments allow for two tests of the relation between
VIE and juror sentencing votes. First, we have previously reported rea-
sonably successful models of juror voting patterns in South Carolina
capital cases. 98 We now add to these models variables designed to test
whether victim admirability increases the likelihood of a juror voting
for a death sentence. As a second test, we examine South Carolina
death sentencing time trends. If VIE substantially affects capital sen-
tencing by promoting death sentences, one might expect death
sentences to have declined from 1987 to 1991, and increased thereaf-
ter, or at least to have increased after 1991.
A. Victim Admirability and Jurors' Sentencing Votes
A variety of factors can influence how jurors vote in the penalty
phase of a capital trial. As a result, studying the influence of victim
admirability requires accounting for other factors known to influence
juror votes. At one extreme, for example, if other factors completely
determine the sentencing trial's outcome, then no room would re-
main for victim admirability to affect outcomes.
95 See 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987), ovemled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
(1991); supra text accompanying note 21.
96 See 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991); supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
97 Sullivan, supra note 65, at 624 (reporting that "[a] majority of jurisdictions now
permit [VIE]").
98 See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 298-302; Eisenberg et al., Remorse,
supra note 6, at 1631-37.
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Previous work using CJP South Carolina interview data develops
several models of jurors' sentencing decisions. 99 That work identifies
a number of case characteristics and juror characteristics as the key
factors that shape ajuror's first sentencing vote.100 To assess the role
of victim admirability on sentencing outcomes, one must control for
these case and juror characteristics.
With respect to case characteristics, prior work shows that the vi-
ciousness of the crime, a defendant's remorse, and juror beliefs re-
garding defendant dangerousness all shape jurors' votes.'1 ' The
more vicious the crime, the more likely a juror will vote for death.10 2
The less remorseful the defendant, the more likely ajuror will vote for
death. 1 - And the less time a juror believes a defendant will spend in
prison if not sentenced to death, and therefore the greater the oppor-
tunity for the defendant to cause harm in the future, the more likely
the juror will vote for death.1 0 4
The importance of crime-seriousness (as measured by the varia-
ble "vicious") in shaping juror votes poses a methodological problem.
If crime seriousness and victim respectability were independent of one
another, we could test for each factor's effect without concern about
their effect on each other. But Table 5 suggests that increased victim
respectability can lead to increased perception of crime seriousness.
Therefore, using the perceived seriousness of the crime as an explana-
tory factor may obscure the importance of the victim's admirability.
We cannot completely avoid this problem, but we do offer a partial
solution.10 5 Some models discussed below exclude the crime serious-
ness variable and replace it with a victim admirability variable. If vic-
tim admirability strongly overlaps with crime seriousness, victim
admirability should be nearly as important as crime seriousness in ex-
plaining juror sentencing votes.
With respect to the personal or demographic characteristics of
jurors, characteristics such as race, sex, age, socioeconomic status, and
religious affiliation, prior work shows that only race and religion sub-
stantially relate to ajuror's first vote at sentencing.116 Holding several
other juror characteristics constant, black jurors were more apt than
white jurors to cast their first sentencing vote for life, while Southern
99 See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 298-302; Eisenberg et al., Rnnorse,
supra note 6, at 1631-37.
100 See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 282-94.
101 Id. at 287-91.
102 See id. at 287-89.
103 See id. at 289-90.
104 See id. at 290-94.
105 A further refinement would be to model simultaneously crime seriousness and case
outcomes in two equations.
106 See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 300-01 tbl.6.
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Baptists were more apt than members of other religions to cast their
first vote for death.10 7
In addition to demographic information, interviewers asked ju-
rors a variety of questions about their attitudes toward the death pen-
alty and the criminal justice system more generally. 0 8 Responses to a
question that asked jurors how strongly they supported the death pen-
alty for convicted murderers helped explain juror voting patterns. 10 9
The five available responses ranged from death being the "only ac-
ceptable" punishment to death being an "unacceptable punish-
ment."'110 The question allowed each juror to rank herself on an
ordinal scale reflecting the strength of the juror's support for the
death penalty. The more a juror supported the death penalty, the
more likely she was to cast her first vote for death.'II
We use the above-described variables in regression models to con-
trol for juror characteristics and the facts of the case while seeking to
identify the effect of perceived victim admirability on a juror's voting
behavior. Table 1 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for
each of these variables. Table 7 reports the regression results.
The first model is the model we report elsewhere,' 12 but now in-
cluding juror interviews conducted after publication of the prior re-
sults. Models (5) and (6) explore whether adding variables about the
victim's admirability improves this baseline model (1). Model (5)
adds the dichotomous variable representing whether the juror ad-
mired the victim. Model (6) adds the ordinal responses to the ques-
tion whether the juror believed the community admired the victim.
Neither variable has a large coefficient, nor does either come close to
achieving statistical significance. 1II
To address the concern that the "Seriousness of the crime" varia-
ble might mask the effect of the victim admirability variables, we ex-
plored models, not reported here, that replaced the "Seriousness of
107 Id.
108 Survey, supna note 12, at 55-57 (Questions Vii.0-7).
109 Id. at 56 (Question Viii.3).
110 The question asked was: "For convicted murderers, do you now feel that the death
penalty is .. " The available responses were: "the only acceptable punishment," "the most
appropriate of several punishments," 'just one of several appropriate punishments," "the
least appropriate of several punishments," and "an unacceptable punishment." Id.
III See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 300-01 tbl.6.
112 See id.
113 We include in some of the models, but do not report here, three additional vari-
ables that account for jurors who express no opinion about the expected prison term, and
for possible changes in juror expectations about prison terms after the Supreme Court's
decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (holding that "where the
defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's re-
lease on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defen-
dant is parole ineligible"). For models that report the effects of these variables, see
Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 300-01 tbl.6.
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TABLE 7
ORDERED PROBIT MODELS OF JURORS' FIRST CAPITAL
SENTENCING VOTES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = JUROR'S FIRST VOTE
(1 = Life 2 = Undecided 3 = Death)
Black juror (1 = yes)
Southern Baptist juror
(1 = yes)
Support for death
penalty (1-5 scale)
Seriousness of the crime
(1-4 scale)
Defendant's remorse
(1-4 scale)
Expected prison term
(years)
Community admired
victim
Juror admired victim
Post-1991 dummy
Observations
Probability > F
Model
(1)
-0.654*
(2.38)
Model
(2)
-0.812**
(2.86)
Model
(3)
-0.765**
(2.78)
Model
(4)
-0.707*
(2.55)
Model
(5)
-0.752*
(2.63)
0.723* 0.540+ 0.443 0.580* 0.655*
(2.45) (1.89) (1.58) (2.07) (2.17)
0.418** 0.422* 0.395*
(2.83) (2.51) (2.51)
0.412* 0.525** 0.459*
(2.35) (2.89) (2.32)
-0.279**
(2.90)
-0.022*
(2.20)
-0.304**
(3.01)
-0.010
(1.16)
0.073
(0.28)
-0.301
(1.18)
202 185
0.0003 0.0001
0.407** 0.435*
(2.75) (2.62)
0.495* 0.455*
(2.60) (2.62)
-0.250** -0.302**
(2.81) (3.41)
-0.012 -0.011
(1.27) (1.23)
0.136
(1.05)
-0.341
(1.44)
188
0.0006
-0.306
(1.30)
202
0.0001
-0.256*
(2.43)
-0.021*
(2.19)
-0.042
(0.16)
Model
(6)
-0.712*
(2.57)
0.606+
(1.99)
0.433**
(2.83)
0.393*
(2.09)
-0.212*
(2.14)
-0.024*
(2.27)
0.047
(0.37)
185 188
0.0002 0.0029
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source -,juror interviews in South Carolina capital cases, 1985-2001.
Note - All models include a dummy variable, not reported here, for whether the juror did
not report an expected prison term. Models (1), (5), and (6) include variables, not
reported here, to account for the possible change in expected prison term after the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina. Models account for clustering at
the case level.
the crime" variable in model (1) with measures of victim admirability.
The coefficients on the admirability variables were small and statisti-
cally insignificant. Thus, victim admirability may affect crime serious-
ness, as Table 5 suggests, but juror perceptions of crime seriousness
help explain sentencing votes substantially more than do juror per-
ceptions of victim admirability.
Models (2), (3), and (4) in Table 7 explore whether a time trend
exists in jurors' first votes. The "Post-1991 dummy" variable corre-
sponds with the Supreme Court's decision in Payne authorizing the
use of VIE. If VIE increases the probability of obtaining death
sentences, then the coefficient for this variable should be positive and
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significant. Post-1991 murders should be more likely than pre-1991
murders to lead to death sentences. Instead, we find a negative and
insignificant coefficient. Thus, to the extent that the year dummy va-
riable captures increased use of VIE, we find little evidence that VIE
affected juror votes or sentencing outcomes in South Carolina cases.
We also explored models using the same set of explanatory vari-
ables as models (5) and (6), but using the jury's final vote for life or
death, instead of each juror's first vote, as the dependent variable." 14
In those models, not reported here, the victim admirability variable
coefficients show a negative correlation. This result suggests that in-
creased victim admirability correlates with reduced likelihood of
death sentences. These effects are not, however, statistically
significant.
B. Time Trend in Death Sentence Rates
The absence of evidence of a relation between victim status and
sentencing outcomes should be assessed in light of the substantial
case selection effects that affect our capital-trial sample. We only ob-
serve those cases in which prosecutors sought death and in which a
trial occurred. Focusing on the jurors' sentencing vote-a single deci-
sion that comes relatively late in the criminal justice process-entails
relying on data that have been filtered by a highly discretionary selec-
tion process. Studying VIE's relation to sentencing outcomes using
only trial data therefore raises a problem of sample selection bias.
For example, the Court's decision in Payne to allow the use of VIE
might have emboldened prosecutors to seek death sentences in more
cases than they would have otherwise. Thus, prosecutors may have
sought death in a group of cases less death-worthy, on average, than
the capital cases brought before Payne. Adding the less-death-worthy
cases to the total mix could lead to more life votes on average over
time. But an increasing percentage of life votes at trial does not necessa-
rily mean VIE had no effect, because the number of death sentences
might have increased despite the percentage time trend observed to-
ward life. That is, prosecutors might have been less likely to obtain
death sentences at trial, but more death sentences might nonetheless
have been obtained because more murders were being tried as capital
murders. Studying tried cases might therefore show a declining trend
in juror votes for death, even though more death sentences were be-
ing imposed, and even though Payne had increased the overall death-
obtaining rate by encouraging prosecutors to seek death more often.
114 For reports of such models, see Eisenberg et al., Farecasting, supra note 6, at 300-01
tbl.6.
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To analyze further the absence of a post-1991 increase in death
sentences, we explore a measure of death-sentencing patterns over
time that is more "bottom-line" and not limited by our interview data.
We examine the number of death sentences in South Carolina in each
year and the number of murders. A substantial pro-death VIE effect
should lead to an increased number of death sentences per murder.
If the number of cases in which prosecutors seek death substantially
increased after Payne, then one should observe increased death-ob-
taining rates after 1991 even if juries imposed death at a lower rate
than before Payne.
Following Gross and Mauro's use of available murder data," 15 we
examine the relation between death sentences and all South Carolina
murders. Doing so provides a "death-obtaining rate" that measures
the death-proneness of the state's entire criminal justice process and
limits the effects of selection bias inherent in studying a select group
of capital trials. To compute South Carolina's death-obtaining rate,
we use two publicly available federal data sets. The first contains data
on every person on death row in the United States. 116 The second
contains data on the vast majority of murders in the United States.' 17
By comparing death row populations with murder populations, one
can detect a change in the rate at which the state imposes the death
penalty over time.
1. South Carolina's Death Row Population
The Bureau of Justice Statistics' (BJS) database, Capital Punish-
ment in the United States, tracks every person sentenced to death from
1973 to 1999.118 The BJS death row data include the state, year of
sentence, and race of the defendant. 119 This information allows one
to compute, for each state, the number and race of persons entering
death row from 1977 through 1999. We refine the sample by limiting
to one observation those individuals who entered the death row data
set, exited from it (perhaps because of a favorable court decision),
and then reentered the sample. We limit the sample to those defend-
ants sentenced after 1976, when the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Geor-
115 SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES
IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 35-36 (1989).
116 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAFISrICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
TlE UNITED STArES, 1973-1999 (Inter-Univ. ConsortiuIm for Pol. and Soc. Research No.
3201, 2001) [hereinafter BJS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT].
117 See JAMES ALAN Fox, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS [UNITED STATES]: SUPPLEMENTARY
HOMICIDE REPORTS, 1976-1998 (Inter-Univ. Consortium for Pol. and Soc. Research No.
3000, 2000).
118 See BJS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 116.
119 See id. at 6.
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gia120 laid the foundation for the modern death penalty era. This
leaves 138 individuals admitted to South Carolina's death row from
1977 through 1999.121
2. South Carolina's Murder Data
The individuals on death row are drawn from the population of
South Carolina murderers. The FBI's Supplementary Homicide Re-
ports (SHR) provide incident level data about murders. 122 For each
murder, the data include the year of the offense; the race, sex, and
age of the victim and of the defendant arrested for the offense; the
county in which the offense occurred; and data about the nature of
the murder, including whether it was committed in the course of cer-
tain crimes such as robbery, rape, burglary, or larceny.1 23 These mur-
der data are among the most reliable crime data. 124 The data exclude
negligent manslaughters and justifiable homicides. 125
The SHR data include unsolved homicides and obviously lack in-
formation about offenders in such cases. 126 Unsolved murders cannot
lead to any sentence for murder-much less a death sentence. 127 If
the data lack the offender's sex, we treat the case as unsolved, and
therefore as if it did not produce a candidate for the death sentence.
Accordingly, we eliminate it from the death sentence rate calcula-
120 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Gregg, the Court approved several new
death penalty statutes on the grounds that they addressed the problems of arbitrariness
and discrimination identified in Furman. See id. at 198. By 1983, in cases such as Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), and Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), the Court had
dismantled "most of the procedural restrictions that were imposed on capital sentencing
by Gregg and the other 1976 death penalty cases." GROSS & MAURO, supra note 115, at 14
n.30.
121 See BJS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 116.
122 See Fox, supra note 117.
123 See id.
124 SeeJohn J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1147, 1153 (1998) (citing David Cantor & Lawrence E. Cohen, Comparing Measures of Homi-
cide Trends: Methodological and Substantive Differences in the Vital Statistics and Uniform Crime
Report Time Series (1933-1975), 9 Soc. ScL. RES. 121 (1980));JohnJ. Donohue, Understand-
ing the Time Path of Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1423, 1425 (1998); John J. Dono-
hue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle
Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1998); Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted
Burdens: American Crime and American Justice at the End of the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
506, 517 (1997) (book review); see also GROSS & MAURO, supra note 115, at 36 ("SHRs are
an excellent source of data on reported homicides."). But see Michael G. Maxfield, Circum-
stances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 671, 675-81
(1989) (suggesting that the SHR data over- and undercount homicides).
125 See Fox, supra note 117, at 1.
126 Id. at 1.
127 See GRoss & MAURO, supra note 115, at 36.
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tions.1 28 For South Carolina, the SHR yield a total of 8,451 murders
for the period 1976 through 1998.
3. Connecting the Death Sentence Data and the Murder Data
It remains to combine the death row population data with the
data on murders. Doing so requires an assumption about the time
from an offense until the time of sentence. Death sentences are im-
posed for crimes committed within a prior time span that is open-
ended. Some crimes take a long time to solve. The mean time from
offense to sentence in our South Carolina data is nineteen months,
while the median time is fifteen months. We therefore make the sim-
plifying assumption that death sentences tend to be imposed within
two years of the crime. We thus treat the pool of potential cases lead-
ing to death sentences as the average of the number of murders com-
mitted in the prior two years. Our results do not materially differ if we
regard the pool of potential cases leading to death sentences as the
number of murders in the prior year.
Given a number of murders potentially leading to death, we com-
pute the death-obtaining rate in each year by dividing the number of
death sentences in a year by the average of the two prior years'
murders. Figure 2 reports the results. It shows, for example, that in
1981 just under 2.4 percent of the average of the two prior years'
murders led to death sentences. In 1991, that figure remained largely
unchanged. The death-obtaining rate shows no systematic trend after
about 1988.
Figure 2's second line tracks the time trend using only black mur-
derers and black entrants onto death row. This separate analysis is
warranted because of the substantial evidence of race effects in the
capital punishment system. Race-of-victim effects are regularly re-
ported in empirical studies, 12 9 and the vast majority of murders are
intraracial. From 1976 through 1999, eighty-six percent of white nmur-
der victims were killed by whites; ninety-four percent of black homi-
128 Gross and Mauro filtered out homicide cases in which age was missing. 1d. at 37.
The number of murders reported here is thus fewer than the number of murders reported
in analyses that focus on the overall murder rate, rather than on murders that led to an
offender arrest. To the extent that arrests are followed by release, the data overstate the
number of offenders upon whom a death sentence might be imposed. We are primarily
concerned with comparisons over time, rather than the absolute level of death sentence
rates. Thus, erroneous murder arrests are of concern only if they vary unevenly over the
time period studied.
129 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDI-
CATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES No. GAO/GGD-90-57 (1990), reprinted in Ti-IE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 268-72 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997);
David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings ftom Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638,
1658-62, 1658 n.61, 1660 n.69, 1742-45 (1998) (listing various studies).
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cide victims were killed by blacks. 130 The figure suggests that the time
trend for black murderers is not materially different than that for
white murderers.
The federal murder and death row data indicate that failure to
observe a time component in the CJP trial data, as shown in Table 7, is
likely not an artifact of studying only tried cases. Within the tried-case
sample, we found no VIE-related time trend. Likewise, in the broader
sample of South Carolina murders and death sentences unaffected by
case selection, we find no posL-Payne time effect on death-obtaining
rates. Thus, while we do have evidence that victim admirability in-
creased over time, perhaps in response to VIE, we do not find evi-
dence that VIE affected death sentence rates in South Carolina, either
at the trial or aggregate level.
C. Accounting for Hindsight and Alternative Explanations
The post-trial interview methodology that the CJP employs is sub-
ject to at least one major limitation. Because jurors were interviewed
after casting their sentencing votes, some may have wittingly or unwit-
tingly tailored their answers to fit their already-cast vote.131 For exam-
ple, a juror might have told us that she thought the crime was
130 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.:
TRENDS By RACE, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/race.htin (last visited Oct. 4,
2002).
1tr See Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6, at 305-06.
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especially vicious or the defendant especially remorseless because she
voted for death, and not the other way around. We have discussed
elsewhere the scope and effects of this limitation with respect to fac-
tors in Table 7, other than the newly added victim admirability vari-
ables and the time variable for post-1991 cases. 132 We showed, for
example, that the juror characteristic effects reported in Table 7-
race, religion, and support for the death penalty-survive in models
that include the sentencing outcome as an explanatory variable, and
are consistent with data from other sources not subject to the inter-
view methodology's hindsight limitation. '33 Thus we are skeptical that
these effects are merely methodological artifacts.
With respect to the victim admirability and time variables intro-
duced above, as well as the VIE-related effects we report, the timing of
the interviews should not be a major concern. The effects we find
(and fail to find) are based on changes or the absence of changes in
juror responses over time. Consequently, jurors could successfully
skew the results only if they were able to shape their responses in a way
that accounted for the responses of jurors in trials occurring during
other time periods. But of course jurors are unlikely to have any
knowledge of interview results or case outcomes in other time periods.
A spurious time effect would depend on jurors in one time period
somehow being more affected by their sentencing vote than jurors in
another time period.
Nevertheless, we cannot eliminate alternative explanations for
some results. Greater victim admirability over time might be a conse-
quence not of prosecutors making increased or better use of VIE, but
of external forces shaping societal attitudes toward victims in many
contexts, including capital trials. Without a study of victim admirabil-
ity in nontrial contexts over time, a broad-based increase in attitudes
toward crime victims could emerge in the CJP trial data, even if there
had been no change over time in the law governing VIE.
Neither the CJP interview data nor the federal data sets on
murders and death sentences generate evidence that victim admirabil-
ity affects South Carolina sentencing outcomes. If the use of VIE
since 1991 made it substantially easier to obtain death sentences, the
post-1991 rate of death sentences per murder should have increased.
We observe no such increase and believe that this evidence supports
the straightforward interpretation of the CJP-based models: the insig-
nificance of the victim admirability and post-1991 variables in Table 7
is evidence that VIE has a modest effect, if any, on sentencing out-
comes. Either VIE failed to substantially shift the likelihood of death
sentences being imposed, or factors not studied here muted what
132 See id.
133 Id. at 300-01 tbl.6, 307-08.
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would otherwise be an observable VIE effect on death sentence rates
over time.
CONCLUSION
Victim status is a part of a crime's effect writ large. Killing a more
prominent or nobler victim might be viewed as inflicting greater harm
on society-a society that believes deeply in retribution. 134 Conse-
quently, it might not be surprising to detect a strong VIE effect on
sentencing outcomes. Our study's failure to detect such an effect
could of course be due to the nature of its data or other methodologi-
cal limitations.
But the absence of an effect in our far-from-trivial sample is also
consistent with a substantial literature on the forces that shape case
outcomes. Outcomes depend largely on facts,135 with secondary fac-
tors such as juror characteristics usually having little importance. 136
In capital murder trials, unless the victim's behavior or status affects
the nature or quality of the crime, 137 VIE's modest effects are consis-
tent with jurors' historic emphasis on salient facts. The absence of a
VIE effect in our data, as well as in the larger South Carolina murder
and death row data sets, is also consistent with the descriptions jurors
themselves give about what they discussed in their deliberations and
what was important to them in deciding what sentence to impose.
134 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153
(2002).
135 SeeJOHN GUINTHER, THEJURY IN AMERICA 102 (1988) ("Juries are evidence-oriented,
both during the course of the trial and during deliberations ...."); SALLY M.A. LLOYD-
BOSTOCK, LAW IN PRACTICE: APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO LEGAL DECISION MAKING AND
LEGAL SKILLS 48 (1989) ("[T]he most important aspect of any case with very few exceptions
tends to be the strength of the evidence."); MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY IN COURT 68 (1978) ("Indeed, the power of evidence is so well recognized by jury
researchers that when studying processes other than evidence, they must calibrate the evi-
dence to be moderate so that it leaves some variance to be influenced by the variables
under study."); Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 194 (1989) ("Typically the evidence, rather than extralegal or
personal factors, drives juror decisionmaking."); Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making:
The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 1, 13-14 (1987) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of the evidence in comparison to extralegal factors).
136 But see Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 6 (presenting evidence of the impor-
tance of race, religion, and juror attitude toward the death penalty in capital cases).
137 Cf Sundby, Empathy, supra note 6, at 128 ("A review of the Capital Jury Project data
from California suggests that capital juries are influenced by victim evidence, at least to the
extent that the evidence pertains to the victim's actions leading up to the crime.").
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN TABLE 7
n Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Black juror (1 = yes) 212 .165 .372 0 1
Southern Baptist juror (1 = yes) 214 .173 .379 0 1
Support for death penalty
(1-5 scale) 212 3.49 .823 1 5
Seriousness of the crime
(1-4 scale) 213 3.70 .646 1 4
Defendant's remorse (1-4 scale) 209 2.00 1.08 1 4
Expected prison term (years) 178 19.53 9.55' 4 60
Community admired victim 199 3.38 .813 1 4
Juror admired victim 195 .590 .493 0 1
Post-1991 dummy 214 .463 .500 0 1
Source -Juror interviews in South Carolina capital cases, 1985-2001.
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